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OVERVIEW — This paper explores the complex connections among intellec-
tual property protection, competition, and access to affordable prescription drug
products. It focuses on several provisions of the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman) and discusses the debate
swirling around its reform. An overview of landmark intellectual property laws
and a description of the generic drug approval process are also included.
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Hatch-Waxman, Generics, and
Patents: Balancing Prescription
Drug Innovation, Competition,
and Affordability
In its ongoing efforts to enact a Medicare prescription drug benefit, the
U.S. Congress continues to be confounded by the many challenges in-
herent in this deceptively complex goal. The price tag for such a ben-
efit—regardless of its political stripe—has been one of the biggest barri-
ers to enactment thus far. In order to make a dent in the various cost
estimates, analysts and Hill staff continue to search for cost-reducing
options. Generics, not surprisingly, have been a beacon in this quest for
greater affordability. But generics also come with a price. That price,
some have argued, could take the form of weakened patent protection
for “innovator” (branded) products. Research-based pharmaceutical
companies, as well as many economists, stress the importance of patent
protection in insuring the viability of future innovation. In the end, con-
sumers want continued access to prescription drugs—at affordable prices.
One of the first legislative attempts to balance innovation, competition,
and prescription drug affordability—the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, often referred to as Hatch-Waxman
or the Hatch-Waxman Act for its framers—made headlines when it was
enacted. Almost 20 years later, it is again making headlines as some in
Congress seek to reform sections of the original law.
In those two decades, extraordinary changes have occurred, many of
which could not have been anticipated in the early 1980s. Quantum leaps
in scientific research and the development of a complex, dynamic mar-
ketplace have resulted in thorny policy and legal challenges. Some of
these changes, it is alleged, have led to loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman
legislation.1 But, where some see fraud and manipulation of the patent
system, others see opportunities to recover risky research investments.
Resolving these legal and policy puzzles requires not only an under-
standing of patents, Hatch-Waxman, and generics but also an apprecia-
tion of the delicate balance that exists between innovation, competition,
and access to affordable drug products.
PATENTS
Intellectual property protection is provided for in the U.S. Constitution.
Congress enacted the basic Patent Act of 1793 under the authority of
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Article I (Section 8, 8) that calls for the patent system “to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.” Patents can cover “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof.”2
Each invention or product can and often does have more than one patent.
There are actually three types of patents that are relevant to pharma-
ceutical products: (a) product patents, (b) use patents, and (c) process
patents. A product patent, which is typically the easiest for a branded
drug company to defend, is conferred on the final marketable product,
that is, the new molecular entity, or NME. The actual molecular entity
that makes a drug unique, and therefore patentable, can itself be made
up of separate components—each of which may also be patentable. All
of these patents are not necessarily obtained at the same time, however.
The drug discovery and development processes are time-intensive, un-
predictable, and nonlinear. As new discoveries are made, perhaps over
the course of many years, separate product patents can be applied for
and granted. Each patent has its own individual time clock.
In addition to the multiple product patents that a company can hold on
an individual drug, companies can also apply for use patents (for par-
ticular indications), as well as for process patents. A process patent would
be granted if a drug product necessitated that the drug be manufac-
tured in a unique way.
Patents can be thought of as a type of insurance policy for inventors,
including research-based pharmaceutical companies. Because of the risk,
expense, and time associated with drug development, only a small number
of prescription drug products actually make it to market. According to
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA),
only 250 out of 5,000 screened compounds ever enter into preclinical
testing. And only one out of five drugs entering clinical trials is ap-
proved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for marketing.
When a drug does succeed, therefore, the company strives to protect its
investment, maximize its profits, provide returns on shareholders’ in-
vestments, and reinvest profits into research, development, marketing,
and other business-related expenses.
There has been much criticism of the patent system as it applies to phar-
maceuticals. Some of the criticism has centered on whether the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) is granting patents for products that should
not be patentable. Others are concerned with the monopoly patents cre-
ate, effectively keeping out competitors. But the research-based phar-
maceutical companies point out that there is strong competition between
products within therapeutic classes.3
Prescription drugs are categorized by therapeutic class (for example, one
therapeutic class of medicine reduces cholesterol, while another improves
Patents can be thought
of as a type of insurance
policy for inventors.
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allergy symptoms). Patents do not preclude other manufacturers from
producing and marketing different drugs to treat the same disease in a
given therapeutic class. There are, for instance, a variety of branded
medicines that could be prescribed for high blood pressure or depres-
sion or pain reduction. Drugs from different therapeutic classes can be
used to treat the same disease or indication (Table 1).
A physician treating a patient presenting with arthritic pain, for example,
has several prescription and nonprescription treatment options. Among
the COX-2 inhibitors, the newest therapeutic class of drugs, are at least
two branded, patented products to treat the pain and inflammation as-
sociated with arthritis. The physician can choose between these two
products or between a similar therapeutic class of drugs, the nonsteroi-
dal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs). The NSAIDs include patented
innovator products and generics as well as over-the-counter medicines.
COX-2 inhibitors were hailed as breakthrough products because of their
seeming ability to decrease the troubling side effects associated with
more traditional NSAIDs. These side effects include gastric bleeding
and ulcers, conditions that can be very serious. On the other hand, there
have been increased reports of serious cardiac events associated with at
least one of the COX-2 products. In addition, COX-2 products are con-
siderably more expensive than the prescription NSAIDs. That cost com-
parison is even more vivid when COX-2s are compared to over-the-
counter products. In the best of all worlds, all of these factors would be
taken into account every time a physician writes a prescription.
When both patented and generic products are available to treat the same
condition, the burden is on the physician—“the learned intermediary”—
Therapeutic Classes
COX-2 Inhibitors
— Vioxx*
— Celebrex*
Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs
(NSAIDs)
— Feldene*
— Naproxen* (generic/over-the-counter)
— Ibuprofen*   (generic/over-the-counter)
Indications
Pain and inflammation associated
with osteo- and rheumatoid arthritis
Pain and inflammation associated
with osteo- and rheumatoid arthritis;
short-term pain relief
*One of the FDA-approved products in this therapeutic class.
Similar Indications, Different Therapeutic Classes
TABLE 1
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to prescribe the most appropriate therapeutic option for the individual
patient. The physician, who presumably is familiar with published clinical
trial results and package inserts (which contain information from pivotal
clinical trials that support the labeled indications, adverse effects, dosing
regimens, warnings, and precautions) ultimately decides what is best for
the patient. Sometimes that decision is influenced by the patient’s insur-
ance policy, which may specify formulary requirements. A patient’s lack
of health insurance (or drug coverage) may also influence a physician’s
prescribing decision. The physician’s decision may be further complicated
by patient interest generated not only by the intense direct-to-consumer
advertising by drug companies that has occurred over the past few years
but also by recent efforts of some pharmacies to influence patients. Ulti-
mately, however, it is the physician,4 perhaps in consultation with the
patient, who determines the most appropriate treatment therapy.
Effective Patent Life
Patents provide exclusive rights to market a product for a specified pe-
riod of time. Before enactment of the Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act
(P.L. 103-465) on June 8, 1995, patents had 17 years of patent life from
the date the patent was issued. The act increased the patent life to 20
years from the date of the first filing of the patent application. The ef-
fective patent life, however, is often less than 20 years because patents,
especially for prescription drugs, are typically obtained prior to mar-
keting. Patents on drug products are typically conferred very early in
the development process. Therefore, many years of additional research
and clinical trials must be conducted to obtain FDA approval to market
the drug. The time it takes for the FDA approval process also “counts
against” the drug’s patent time clock. The full patent term in the United
States is 20 years. Effective patent life—the period of market exclusivity
when the product is actually on the market (without generic competi-
tion)—is generally calculated by subtracting the number of years it took
to receive final FDA marketing approval from the date the patent was
filed (not the date the patent was granted).
According to research conducted for PhRMA, “The average period of
effective patent life for new medicines introduced in the early to mid-
1990s with patent term restoration has been 11 to 12 years. Innovators in
other industries, who don’t receive regulatory approval before going to
market, typically receive more than 18.5 years of effective patent life.”
Others have taken issue with the notion of “effective patent life,” refer-
ring to that period of time as a commercial monopoly. Alfred B. Engelberg,
an attorney who has worked with the generic drug industry, wrote:
Clearly, the search for the definition of ‘effective patent life’ or the belief
that meaningful statistics may be developed to establish that it is shrink-
ing as a result of government regulation, is an exercise in futility. Each
product has its own unique development, commercialization, and patent
history, which makes any generalization in this area highly suspect. An
Patents provide ex-
clusive rights to mar-
ket a product for a
specified period of
time.
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average effective patent life figure that is derived solely by subtracting
the NDA [new drug application] approval date from the patent expira-
tion date without considering that history has no validity.5
Patent Term Restoration
As pointed out above by the research-based pharmaceutical companies,
even with patent term restoration, periods of market exclusivity for
drug products are typically shorter than for other products. On the other
hand, even in their truncated number of effective patent life years, many
of the drug products earn enormous returns, some topping $1 billion in
sales annually. The branded, patent-protected drug products are virtu-
ally always priced higher, often significantly higher than their generic
counterparts. The innovator drug companies argue that the cost of re-
search and development contribute to the higher prices of the innovator
product. (Table 2)
Critics contend that it is advertising, marketing, greed and the insatiable
demands of shareholders that drive the price of these drugs out of reach
of significant numbers of (often the most vulnerable) patients. These ar-
guments are not new; they have been circulating on and around Capitol
Hill for many years, paving the way for increased interest in generics.
GENERICS
Generics save consumers—and third-party payers—money (see Table 3).
A July 1998 Congressional Budget Office report estimated annual savings
TABLE 2
Cost of Drug Innovation Versus Imitation
Pioneer Product Generic Product
Long gestation periods — Short gestation periods —
10 to 14 years 1 to 2 years
Low success rates — only 1 in
5 NCE (new chemical entity)
candidates entering clinical
testing become marketed drugs
High R&D costs — $350 to $600 Low R&D costs — $1 to $2 million
million and higher per NCE to demonstrate bioequivalence*
High success rates
Based on a presentation by Henry Grabowski, Patents and Generic Competition, American
Enterprise Institute, March 28, 2001.
*Some have pointed out that generics face additional R&D expenses when there are unexpired
patents requiring the design of the generic around the branded company’s patents.
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TABLE 3
Comparisons of Prices for Prescription Drugs (P), Generics (G), and
Over-the-Counter (OTC) Drugs in Several Categories
Dose per Doses per Price per
Drugs (Availability)1 Tablet Bottle Bottle
Depression
Fluoxetine Hydrochloride (G) 20 mg 30 $46.99
Zoloft (P) 50 mg 30 $67.42
Paxil (P) 20 mg 30 $76.80
Prozac (P) 20 mg 30 $85.98
Arthritis/Joint Pain
Ibuprofen (G) 600 mg 30 $7.99
Motrin (OTC) 200 mg 100 $8.49
Celebrex (P) 200 mg 30 $71.73
Vioxx (P) 25 mg 30 $73.29
Heartburn
Pepcid AC (OTC) 10 mg 30 $9.99
Ranitidine hydrochloride (G) 150 mg 60 $10.80
Zantac (P) 150 mg 60 $101.57
Prevacid (P) 30 mg 30 $113.70
Nexium (P) 20 mg 30 $115.51
Prilosec (P) 20 mg 30 $115.80
High Cholesterol
Lovastatin (G) 20 mg 30 $36.00
Lipitor (P) 10 mg 30 $59.86
Zocor (P) 10 mg 30 $66.94
Mevacor (P) 20 mg 30 $68.99
Allergies
Benadryl (OTC) 25 mg* 24 $4.49
Clarinex (P) 5 mg 20 $66.41
Allegra (P) 60 mg 60 $70.98
Claritin (P) 10 mg 30 $78.60
*25 mg of diphenhydramine hydrochloride.
Source: Wall Street Journal Research; pricing from Drugstore.com (See Scott Hensley,
“How New Generics Can Cut Your Drug Expenses,” Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2002).
Comments
The antidepressants have
similar effectiveness and
side effects, but results vary
somewhat by patient.
Ibuprofen and Motrin can
cause serious stomach
problems in rare cases;
Vioxx is notably gentler.
Zantac and the generic,
ranitidine work differently
from Prilosec and Prevacid,
but are generally used to
treat the same ailments.
Lovastatin, the generic
version of Mevacor, may
not lower cholesterol as
much or as quickly as
Zocor and Lipitor.
Benadryl may cause
drowsiness but also may be
more effective than some
prescription nonsedating
antihistamines.
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to consumers of $8 billion to $10 billion dollars from generic substitu-
tion in the mid-1990s.6 In December 2000, General Motors Corporation,
which spends over $1 billion on pharmaceuticals annually, calculated
that “for each one percent increase in the use of generic drugs, GM can
save $3 million a year.”7
Before Hatch-Waxman, generics represented only 13 percent of all pre-
scription medication. Since the 1980s, however, the use of generics has
greatly increased; 45 percent of all prescriptions in 2001 were filled with
generic drugs, although that figure represents only about 8 percent of all
dollars spent on drugs.8 Along with the enactment of Hatch-Waxman, the
passage of state-level drug-product substitution laws allowing pharma-
cists to dispense a generic, even when a brand-name drug had been pre-
scribed, and the active promotion of generic substitution by government
health programs and private health plans have spurred the increase in
generic sales. Congressional interest in drug prices and drug patents were
at the center of the original discussions surrounding the Drug Price Com-
petition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, just as they are today.
HATCH-WAXMAN
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, a former commissioner of patents and trade-
marks at the PTO, provided some historical context on the passage of
Hatch-Waxman in a 1999 article in the Food and Drug Law Journal:
The plan for patent term restoration had its beginnings in President
Carter’s Administration. In 1978 President Carter launched a major do-
mestic policy review on industrial innovation and that team recom-
mended patent term restoration for pharmaceuticals and any other prod-
uct that required regulatory review—to compensate for, or restore to the
term of the patents, the time lost in regulatory review. President Reagan’s
Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade also supported the
proposal....Then-Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge set up an
intellectual property committee under the Cabinet Council on Commerce
and Trade....The committee recommended, and the Cabinet Council sup-
ported, patent term restoration. That recommendation turned into the
bill, S. 255 (98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1984) that passed in the Senate and was
referred to the House of Representatives.
In the House, the bill’s supporters put it on the suspension calendar,
which requires a majority of two-thirds to suspend all the rules and
enact the bill....S. 255 failed....The vote, however, served as a wake-up
call for generic drug manufacturers. Congressman Henry A. Waxman
(D-CA), one of the most effective in the House of Representatives and
then-Chairman of the Health Subcommittee, took on the issue. Sud-
denly, what had been a patent term restoration bill became a patent
term restoration and drug price competition bill, and a whole new title
was added that complicated the bill even further.9
When enacted, Hatch-Waxman (P.L. 98-417) contained provisions cov-
ering drug price competition and the abbreviated new drug application
Before Hatch-Waxman,
generics represented
only 13 percent of all
prescription medica-
tion.
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(ANDA) process for generics (Title I) and patent term restoration (pri-
marily Title II).
Abbreviated New Drug Application Process
In order to encourage greater access to lower-priced drug products,
Hatch-Waxman sought to shorten the time it took for generics to reach
the market. The act created the ANDA process, which eliminated lengthy
and expensive clinical trials. This new “abbreviated” approval process
breathed new life into the fledgling generic drug industry.
According to the FDA, a generic drug is “identical, or bioequivalent to
a brand name drug in dosage form, safety, strength, route of adminis-
tration, quality, performance characteristics and intended use.”10 In short,
generic drugs are chemically identical to their branded counterparts.
Even if a generic has a different color, a different taste, or comes in a
different shape11 or package, the FDA considers the product to be equiva-
lent if it meets the same standards for strength, quality, purity and iden-
tity as the branded product.
When patents or other periods of exclusivity (see section below) expire,
manufacturers can apply to the FDA to sell generic versions of the inno-
vator products. Drug companies must submit an ANDA to the FDA’s
Office of Generic Drugs in the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
for approval to market a generic product. To gain FDA approval, a ge-
neric drug must meet the following criteria:
■ Contain the same active ingredient(s) as the innovator drug (inac-
tive ingredients may vary).
■ Be identical in strength, dosage form, and route of administration.
■ Have the same use indications.
■ Be bioequivalent (performs in the same manner as the innovator
drug).
■ Meet the same batch requirements for identity, strength, purity, and
quality.
■ Be manufactured under the same strict standards of the FDA’s
good manufacturing practice regulations required for innovator
products.
Once approved by the FDA, all products, both innovator as well as
generic, are listed in the FDA’s Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations, also known as the “Orange Book.”
For drugs first marketed after 1962, the ANDA process does not require
the drug sponsor to repeat costly animal (preclinical) and human (clini-
cal) research on ingredients or dosage forms already approved for safety
and effectiveness. Hence the term “abbreviated.” Instead of repeating
these expensive and time-consuming efforts, generic applicants, unlike
the innovator sponsor, need only demonstrate bioequivalence. “One way
10
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scientists demonstrate bioequivalence is to measure the time it takes the
generic drug to reach the bloodstream in 24 to 36 healthy volunteers.
This gives the rate of absorption, or bioavailability, of the generic drug,
which they can then compare to that of the innovator drug. The generic
version must deliver the same amount of active ingredients into a
patient’s bloodstream in the same amount of time as the innovator drug.”12
Generic Drug Competition Provisions
Several important—and hotly debated—provisions that relate directly to
the generic competition portion of Hatch-Waxman are highlighted below:
Paragraph IV Certification — As a result of Hatch-Waxman, the Food
Drug and Cosmetics Act requires that, among other things, one of the
following four certifications be made when filing an ANDA:
■ The drug has not been patented.
■ The patent has already expired.
■ The generic drug will not go on the market until the patent expira-
tion date passes.
■ The patent is not infringed or is invalid.
These certifications are referred to as the paragraphs I, II, III, and IV
certifications. Paragraph IV certifications, which are essentially generic
drug patent challenge notifications, became a major issue during the
drafting of Hatch-Waxman. It continues to generate considerable atten-
tion today and is the focus of both congressional and regulatory atten-
tion. At issue is the automatic 30-month postponements or ANDA stays.
ANDA and the 30-Month Stay Period — To begin the FDA approval
process, a generic applicant must do two things: (a) certify in its ANDA
that the patent in question is invalid or is not infringed by the generic
product (the “paragraph IV certification”) and (b) notify the patent holder
of the submission of the ANDA. If the patent holder files an infringe-
ment suit against the generic applicant within 45 days of the ANDA
notification, FDA approval to market the generic version is automati-
cally postponed for 30 months (unless, before that time, the patent ex-
pires or is judged to be invalid or not infringed). This 30-month post-
ponement allows the patent holder time to assert its patent rights in
court before the generic competitor is permitted to enter the market.
The 30-month stay is meant to allow time for the patent holder to liti-
gate, although the litigation may in fact take longer.
It is important to note that if a generic were to come to market before
successfully completing a challenge, its manufacturer would be subject to
treble damages based upon the brand manufacturer’s profits. Some ana-
lysts point out that going to court has no real downside for the brand
manufacturers because the 30-month stay is automatic and worth far more
in profits than the cost of litigation. Much of the recent attention, (dis-
cussed further in the “Reforming Hatch-Waxman: Closing the Gaps”
Some point out that go-
ing to court has no real
downside for the brand
manufacturers because
the 30-month stay is au-
tomatic and worth far
more in profits than the
cost of litigation.
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section below), has centered on what many see as the exploitative initia-
tion of 30-month postponements by innovator companies. Multiple 30-
month stays can further delay any generic entry.
The 180-Day Exclusivity Period — Under Hatch-Waxman, an applicant
can seek FDA approval to market a generic drug before the expiration
of the patent of the branded product upon which the generic is based.
The first company to submit a paragraph IV certification ANDA to the
FDA has the exclusive right to market the generic drug for 180 days. This
180-day exclusivity period was included in the legislation to encourage
generic companies to invest in the required product testing and to cover
expensive legal challenges to pioneer (innovator) products. The generic
drug industry has itself become competitive since the enactment of Hatch-
Waxman. Over time, this 180-day exclusivity period has created some
contention and confusion as to when the 180-day period begins and which
generic firm is first. In addition, this provision continues to generate con-
cern and calls for reform, largely because of the incentive it creates for
brand and generic companies to enter into anticompetitive arrangements
under which, for example, the generic manufacturer accepts payment from
a brand name company not to market the generic product, thus effec-
tively blocking all other generics from entering the market.
Data Exclusivity — Another important element of the generic competi-
tion component of Hatch-Waxman involves what has been referred to
as “data exclusivity.” The act protects an innovator’s proprietary clinical
research data from use or reference by others for five years. This provi-
sion precludes generic applications from submission to the FDA until
five years after the FDA has approved the innovator drug for market-
ing. PhRMA notes in its “2002 Pharmaceutical Industry Profile”: “In con-
trast, members of the European Union provide between five and 10
years of protection, during which time marketing approval will not be
provided to competitors that seek to rely directly or indirectly on the
data generated by the innovator of the product.”13
Patent Term Restoration Provisions
The section of the code that pertains to patent term restoration is long
and complicated. The provisions cover numerous situations and run the
gamut from due diligence petitions to multiple investigational new drugs
(INDs) to criteria for determining whether a patent for a human drug
product is eligible for patent extension.
A pioneer product can receive an extension term—the patent term res-
toration—that is equal to one-half of the time of the IND period (the
point at which human clinical trials begin) and the new drug application
(NDA) period (that is, when the NDA is reviewed by the FDA). A hu-
man drug product patent is deemed to be eligible for a patent extension
if it satisfies the following six conditions:
12
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■ The applicant must show that the patent has not expired.
■ The applicant must establish that the patent has not previously been
extended.
■ The patent owner or its agent must submit an application for patent
term restoration that includes details about the patent and the activi-
ties undertaken to secure FDA approval.
■ The applicant must establish that the product was subject to a
regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or use.
■ The applicant must show that the product either represents the first
permitted commercial marketing or use of the product after the
regulatory review period.
■ The applicant must submit the application for patent term restora-
tion to the PTO within 60 days of FDA approval of the commercial
marketing application.14
Hatch-Waxman mandates that a maximum of five years can be restored
to the patent and that the total patent life (that is, period of market
exclusivity) with the patent extension cannot exceed 14 years. If the
patent life of the product after approval has 14 or more years left, the
product would not be eligible for patent extension.
According to the FDA, “FDA’s primary responsibility is to assist the
PTO in determining a product’s eligibility for patent term restoration
and to provide information to PTO regarding a product’s regulatory
review period....FDA also has the responsibility for due diligence peti-
tions and due diligence hearings. PTO is responsible for determining
the period of patent extension. FDA defers to PTO on all matters in-
volving the construction and validity of patent claims.”15
This is a particularly critical issue, especially for generic drug compa-
nies. While the PTO has responsibility for patent approval and the FDA
has the authority to approve drug products for marketing, no agency
has oversight of the Orange Book or, therefore, of the validity of the
patents listed within it. This lack of accountability is problematic for
generic companies, who argue that the FDA should play a larger role in
determining the validity of patents prior to listing them in the Orange
Book. The FDA, in turn, would argue that review of patents is the job of
the PTO and that the FDA’s role does not include Orange Book over-
sight. The dispute is important because of the relationship between an
Orange Book listing and the 30-month stay.
Hatch-Waxman also contains a provision whereby the manufacturer of
the innovator product must exercise due diligence in order to achieve
patent term restoration. In fact, the Hatch-Waxman Act overruled a U.S.
Court of Appeals decision in the famous Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceu-
ticals case, in which the court held that a generic company could not manu-
facture and test a medicine before the patent expires even if its only pur-
pose was to prepare a marketing application. Under Hatch-Waxman,
While the PTO has re-
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has the authority to ap-
prove drug products for
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generic manufacturers are allowed to use pioneer medi-
cines still under patent to obtain bioequivalency data
for their FDA applications. This provision enables ge-
neric products to be dispensed to patients the day after
the innovator’s patent becomes ineffective or expires.
Analysts are bracing for a bull market in generics as
more than $20 billion worth of brand-name drug prod-
ucts reach the end of their patent terms over the next
several years. With a significant number of top-selling
prescription drugs involved, many brand-name research
pharmaceutical companies are seeking ways to extend
their patent protection.
In their zeal to remain competitive, a number of com-
panies have attempted to expand this protection. Re-
cently, a number of cases revealing serious and signifi-
cant abuses have come to light. A number of the methods that have been
employed by some drug companies (both brand and generic) have raised
the ire and concern of members of Congress, consumer groups, health
insurers, state attorneys general, and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC).16 These concerns have lead to suits, charges, and efforts by some
to modernize Hatch-Waxman.
REFORMING HATCH-WAXMAN:
CLOSING THE GAPS
With every patent that is set to expire, an enormous amount of money is
at stake for innovator companies, generic firms, consumers, and attor-
neys. Many of the tactics that have been called into question recently
are directed at both the brand-name and the generic companies. While
not all licenses and agreements used to resolve patent disputes between
innovator and generic companies are inherently anticompetitive and vio-
late antitrust laws, the FTC has been particularly concerned about the
possible anticompetitive activities of pioneer pharmaceutical companies
in using the 30-month stay and the 180-day marketing exclusivity provi-
sions of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The FTC has also kept its attention
focused on generic firms exhibiting anticompetitive behavior.
Questionable Practices
The types of practices that have been brought to the attention of the
FTC,17 other regulatory agencies, and the courts include the following:
Evergreening — A practice whereby a company, as its product is about
to go “off-patent” will begin to patent additional features of the prod-
uct or introduce a slightly modified version of the existing drug form.
Companies may, for example, introduce a new dosage formulation or
an over-the-counter version of the product. Sometimes these changes
Major Patent Expirations  2002–2005
2002 Augmentin (antibiotic)
2003 Biaxin (antibiotic)
Flonase/Flovent (allergy)
2004 Claritin (allergy)
Diflucan (antifungal)
2005 Epogen/Procrit (anemia)
Pravachol (statin)
Zocor (statin)
Zithromax (antibiotic)
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provide superior therapeutic advances. But exclusivity has been granted
to brand companies for minor product and labeling changes that many
have argued present little or no therapeutic benefit. While this practice
is not necessarily illegal, it causes concern because it ultimately post-
pones generic market entry.
Staggered Orange Book Listings — Before a generic comes to market,
its manufacturer must certify to each and every patent listed in the Or-
ange Book, thus creating the incentive for brand name manufacturers to
delay listing some of their patents in the Orange Book. If a brand name
company chooses to file a lawsuit, the 30-month stay is automatic, re-
gardless of the merits of the new patent. Each stay triggers the auto-
matic delay in generic approvals (until the stay expires or the court re-
solves the dispute.) By staggering their Orange Book patent listings,
innovator companies can extend their market exclusivity indefinitely. It
is the alleged use of strategic Orange Book listings to achieve multiple
30-month stays that has drawn attention. Some have argued that Con-
gress never intended that there be more than one 30-month stay on a
given drug. The FTC is investigating the existence of invalid patents.
Brand Migration — One of several patent and exclusivity strategies
designed to extend product life cycles and thereby delay competition.
Towards the end of a drug’s exclusivity period, some companies have
focused on marketing efforts to “convert” or direct patients to the
company’s other product, such as a new branded product that is heavily
promoted to both patients and physicians (for example, AstraZeneca’s
attempt to move patients currently on Prilosec, which is nearing its patent
expiration, to its patented successor product, Nexium).
Anticompetitive Agreements between Brand and Generic Companies
— Under these agreements manufacturers of brand-name products have
colluded with generic manufacturers to delay or eliminate specific ge-
neric drugs from entering the market (for example, an April 2001 FTC
press release announced a consent agreement with Hoechst Marion
Roussel [HMR], now Aventis, and Andrx Corporation to resolve an al-
legedly illegal agreement between the companies that affected the $750
million-a-year market for Cardizem CD, a widely prescribed drug used
to treat hypertension and angina. The FTC’s complaint alleged that HMR,
the manufacturer of Cardizem CD, agreed to pay Andrx millions of
dollars to delay bringing its generic version of the drug to market. There
have been several examples of companies entering into such
anticompetitive agreements: Abbott/Geneva, Schering-Plough/Upsher-
Smith/ESI Lederle, and most recently, Bristol-Myers Squibb, which ille-
gally kept generic versions of the cancer drug Taxol off the market for
three years.) It is also worth noting that several state attorneys general
have also filed suit in these cases.
Anticompetitive Agreements between Generic Companies — The FTC
is also concerned with maintaining competition among generic firms. In
15
NHPF Background Paper June 21, 2002
FTC v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., the FTC and several states sued Mylan,
charging “Mylan and other companies with monopolization, attempted
monopolization, and conspiracy in connection with agreements to elimi-
nate much of Mylan’s competition by tying up supplies of the key ingre-
dients for two widely-prescribed anxiety drugs—lorazepam and
clorazepate.”18
FTC Study
Given the heightened awareness of possible impropriety and the com-
plexity that exists within the patent legislation arena, the FTC has un-
dertaken a study of pharmaceutical practices related to the Hatch-
Waxman Act. By focusing on four areas, the study’s findings should
yield valuable information as Congress continues to consider possible
reforms to Hatch-Waxman. The study is examining the following:
■ The extent to which agreements between brand-name pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers and generic drug firms may have delayed generic
competition.
■ The operation of provisions in Hatch-Waxman that award a 180-day
period of market exclusivity to a generic firm.
■ The impact of (a) provisions in the act on the listing of patents by
brand-name pharmaceutical companies in the FDA Orange Book and
(b) provisions that trigger a stay on FDA approval of a proposed
generic drug.
■ The use of the FDA’s Citizen Petition process by brand-name drug
companies to oppose potential generic entrants.
The study, begun in October 2000 and due out in the fall of 2001, has not
yet been completed. According to FTC, the study is expected to be re-
leased in the summer of 2002.19
Proposed Solutions
In their effort to close what they see as gaps that currently exist in Hatch-
Waxman, Sens. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.)
have introduced S. 812, the “Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuti-
cals Act of 2001,” also known as the GAAP Act. A companion bill in the
House, H.R. 1862, is sponsored by Reps. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) and
Jo Anne Emerson (R-Mo.). Among other things, these bills would
■ Eliminate the automatic 30-month stay brand companies receive
when filing suit against a generic challenger.
■ Reform the 180-day rule by providing a “rolling exclusivity” to
generic drug applicants.
■ Stop the filing of citizen petitions (usually by competitor companies,
brand or generic) with the FDA.
■ Require the FTC to assess the impact of the GAAP Act.
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The GAAP Act has enjoyed a ground swell of support, particularly as
the 2002 election looms closer and the hope of enacting a Medicare pre-
scription drug benefit drifts farther away. Nevertheless, two powerful
opponents have weighed in—PhRMA, the trade association represent-
ing the brand-name drug industry and Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), one
of the two original sponsors of the 1984 Hatch-Waxman legislation.
PhRMA claims the GAAP Act would “cripple effective remedies for patent
infringement, permit generic drugs that do not duplicate their reference
drugs, inhibit the submission of citizen petitions, and revise generic ex-
clusivity to keep more rival generics off the market for six months and
permit unnecessary litigation.”20 However, Hatch, testifying before the
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions on May 8,
2002, stated that “no law as complex as the 1984 Act is so perfect that it
cannot be improved as it faces the tests of time and changing condi-
tions. In my view, there have been several unintended and unantici-
pated consequences of the 1984 law and other changes in the pharma-
ceutical sector that bear attention by Congress.” Nevertheless, Hatch
stated that he opposed adoption of the bill in its current form. “Without
additional facts, my preliminary view at this point is that the provisions
of McCain-Schumer related to the 30-month stay may overcorrect a prob-
lem that may, in fact, be somewhat overstated in the first place.” The
senator also took issue with the bill’s reform of the 180-day rule. De-
spite this particular opposition, there is still much support not only for
the proposed legislation but also for the general notion of reforming
Hatch-Waxman and increasing access to more affordable drugs.
OTHER PERIODS OF EXCLUSIVITY
It is worth noting that, in addition to patents, other means can confer
prescription drug products with periods of market exclusivity. Two of
these are provided through the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 and the FDA
Modernization Act of 1997.
■ The Orphan Drug Act was passed in 1983 to encourage the develop-
ment of what is referred to as orphan drugs, that is, drugs used to
treat diseases that affect fewer than 200,000 people. It has been
estimated that 10 to 20 million Americans suffer from approximately
5,000 orphan diseases for which no effective cure or treatment exists.
In order to make it commercially feasible to develop orphan drugs,
the law provides a 50 percent tax credit for certain clinical research
expenses, in addition to a seven-year period of market exclusivity
(following approval by the FDA).
■ As part of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, or FDAMA, Con-
gress provided pharmaceutical manufacturers with a research incen-
tive—six months of additional marketing exclusivity for pharmaceuti-
cal companies to conduct FDA-requested studies of drugs commonly
used to treat children. This provision was reauthorized in 2001 for six
more years.
The Orphan Drug Act of
1983 and the FDA Mod-
ernization Act of 1997
provide two means of
conferring prescription
drug products with pe-
riods of market exclu-
sivity.
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ADDITIONAL POLICY AND REGULATORY
CONSIDERATIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD
Patents, market exclusivity, and innovation are affected by a host of
factors, including tax policy, technology transfer, and international trade.
Domestic Policy and Regulatory Considerations
Patents alone are not enough inducement or protection for drug re-
searchers and manufacturers to take on the daunting work of discovery
and development. Many argue that to conquer diseases for which cures
do not exist, to continue to transfer knowledge and technology from
federal laboratories to the private sector for commercialization, and to
continue to chip away at the untapped marvels of science will take a
commitment and a level of resources that can only be met through a
public-private partnership. To that end, several initiatives have been
established, including the passage of landmark legislation such as the
Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act of 1980 (more commonly
referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act) that provides strong incentives for
public-private research collaborations. The R&D tax credit, which is set
to expire in 2004, has also provided a significant incentive for compa-
nies, including pharmaceutical companies, to increase their investment
in U.S.-based research and development.
Questions have been raised, however, as to what constitutes the right
balance between taxpayer-supported research and the private sector’s
right to set prices, hold patents, and reap the benefits of its commercial-
ized products. While the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, the
question is relevant in that breakthrough innovation in medical science
involves striking a balance between risk, resources, and incentives to
commercialize what some consider a public good.
International Trade and Patent Protection
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry is a world leader in the research and
development of new products. But while pharmaceutical companies (sev-
eral of which are multinational) are busy protecting their domestic pat-
ents, patent piracy costs the industry hundreds of millions of dollars
every year, despite various provisions agreed to in NAFTA (the North
American Free Trade Agreement) and GATT (the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade). Patent protection has become an important part
of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) trade rules. During the WTO
Uruguay Round of agreements, for example, the WTO brought intellec-
tual property into the global trading system through the Agreement of
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), outlining
policies for such controversial matters as compulsory licensing.
In light of recent international trade negotiations, some analysts have
questioned whether companies end up with greater patent protection
Patent piracy costs the
industry hundreds of
millions of dollars each
year.
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than they otherwise would receive under U.S. law. Given the huge
variety of patent laws that differ from country to country and the patent
violations that occur overseas, the ultimate effects on both the U.S. brand
and generic pharmaceutical industries are not yet clear.
CONCLUSION
The compromise Congress hammered out 20 years ago in an effort to
balance additional effective patent life with quicker access to generic
drugs was controversial then and continues to stir debate today. While
some have called for the reform of Hatch-Waxman to address perceived
shortcomings and gaps, others maintain that the original bill should
remain intact, until such time as additional evidence of abuse or circum-
stances warrant change.
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